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Abstract 
Evidence supports that being overwhelmed by many choice options predicts negative 
consequences. However, there is uncertainty regarding the effects of choice overload on two key 
motivational dimensions: (1) the extent to which people view their decision as subjectively 
valuable (versus not), and (2) the extent to which people view themselves as capable (versus 
incapable) of reaching a good decision. While evaluating their options and while deciding, we 
assessed theory-based cardiovascular responses reflecting these dimensions. A meta-analysis 
across two experiments found that participants who made a final selection from many options—
relative to those who chose from few or rated many—exhibited cardiovascular responses 
consistent with greater task engagement (i.e., perceiving greater subjective value), as well as 
greater threat (i.e., perceiving fewer resources to manage situational demands). The current work 
suggests a novel motivational account of choice overload, providing insight into the nature and 
timing of this experience as it occurs. 
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Too Many Fish in the Sea: A Motivational Examination of the Choice Overload Experience 
In modern society, people are constantly exposed to more options than they can 
reasonably consider. Scanning Netflix provides people with nearly 6,000 programs to guiltily 
binge, while logging on to OkCupid connects people to as many as 5 million other active users. 
Even searching for something as trivial as a toothbrush yields 30,000 results on Amazon, ranging 
from manual to mechanical, charcoal to chargeable. Although people broadly seek out and prefer 
larger (versus smaller) arrays of options (e.g., Berger, Draganaska, & Simonson, 2007), an 
overabundance of choice can also paradoxically make people less inclined to choose. Research 
examining choice overload demonstrates that people are not only more likely to defer making a 
decision from many options compared to few options (Anderson, Taylor, & Holloway, 1966; 
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Reed, Digennaro Reed, Chock, & Brozyna, 2011), but demonstrate 
more negative subjective (e.g., greater regret and dissatisfaction; Haynes, 2009; Markus & 
Schwartz, 2013; Schwartz, 2004) and objective (e.g., poorer decision quality; Hanoch et al., 
2009; Tanius et al., 2009; Botti & Hsee, 2010) outcomes as a result of their choice. 
Although ample evidence exists for these negative outcomes (for a review, see Chernev, 
Bockenhold, & Goodman, 2015), there is less consensus in the literature regarding the 
motivational states experienced during choice overload. Specifically, there remains uncertainty 
regarding choice overload’s effects on two key motivational dimensions: (1) the extent to which 
people view their decision as subjectively valuable (versus not), and (2) the extent to which 
people view themselves as capable (versus incapable) of reaching a good, reasoned decision. For 
instance, seemingly contradictory research suggests that being exposed to more options results in 
choices seeming both less (Reed et al., 2011) and more (Schwartz, 2010; Cheek & Schwartz, 
2017) subjectively valuable. Additionally, individuals report exceedingly high expectations for 
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their ability to make a good decision when initially presented with many options (Diehl & 
Poyner, 2010). Despite these initially high expectations, they also ultimately view their decisions 
as less satisfying and poorer in quality, suggesting that they may feel relatively incapable of 
reaching a good decision in this context (Haynes, 2009; Markus & Schwartz, 2013; Schwartz, 
2004).  
Given ambiguities in these key motivational dimensions, multiple and largely 
incompatible motivational accounts have been posed regarding how choice overload operates in 
the moment. Thus, the current work used temporally-sensitive, theory-ba ed cardiovascular 
measures (Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Seery, 2011, 2013; Seery & Quinton, 
2016) to assess these motivational dimensions throughout the choice overload experience. 
Specifically, while initially evaluating their options and while making a decision, we 
continuously monitored the degree to which individuals perceived a decision task as subjectively 
valuable or self-relevant (reflected in cardiovascular responses of task engagement), and the 
extent to which individuals perceived themselves as relatively capable or incapable of managing 
this decision task (reflected in cardiovascular responses of relative challenge or threat). By 
continually examining momentary psychological states without interrupting for self-reflection, 
the current work presents a novel motivational account of the choice overload experience, 
providing critical insight into both the nature and timing of this experience as it occurs.  
Choice Overload 
Generally speaking, people tend to prefer having more options over fewer (Berger et al., 
2007; Diel & Poyner, 2010; Chernev, 2006; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). Marketing research 
demonstrates that consumers are attracted to retailers who offer larger assortments, and that 
assortment size is an important factor in determining brand choice (Arnold, Oum, & Tigert 1983; 
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Berger et al., 2007; Broniarczyk et al. 1998; Redden & Hoch 2009). Similarly, Diehl and Poyner 
(2010) found that participants who were assigned to view many options to choose from held 
greater expectations for their upcoming choice quality than did those who were assigned to view 
few options. Consistent with these preferences, there are many benefits to seeking out more 
options, one being that it increases the likelihood of finding a choice that meets one’s desires and 
needs (Baumol & Ide, 1956; Chernev, 2003). Large choice sets provide greater potential for 
flexibility and variety-seeking behavior, while also creating the perception of more freedom of 
choice (Kahn, Moore, & Glazer, 1987; Levav & Zhu, 2009). Relatedly, large assortments tend to 
reduce individuals’ uncertainty of whether their choice set adequately represents all available 
options. When people have many options to choose from, they can be more confident that this set 
of options does not lack a potentially superior alternative (Greenleaf & Lehmann, 1995). 
Although people desire and hold higher expectations for their decisions when faced with 
many options, research demonstrates that having too many options also paradoxically decreases 
one’s likelihood of reaching a decision. For example, though people at a grocery store were more 
likely to approach a stand containing 24 varieties of jam than they were to approach a stand 
containing six, those who approached the stand containing 24 varieties were considerably less 
likely to make a purchase (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). In this same work, students who chose to 
write about one of 30 extra credit essay topics (versus one of 6 essay topics), were not only less 
likely to commit to completing their essay, but wrote poorer quality essays overall (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000. Reed and colleagues (2011) found that direct care staff members’ willingness to 
examine options for special-needs programs decreased steadily as the number of choices 
increased. Relatedly, Anderson and colleagues (1966) found that, when individuals’ number of 
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options increased, so too did their tendency to resort to selecting a choice that others had chosen 
previously, relieving themselves of the onerous duty of making their own decision. 
When the situation does not allow individuals to defer their choice, selecting from many 
options, relative to few, yields greater retrospective frustration and difficulty with the decision-
making process, as well as greater regret and dissatisfaction with whatever decision is made 
(Chernev et al., 2015; Haynes, 2009). Although an early meta-analysis questioned the support for 
such effects (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010), a more recent and comprehensive one 
conducted across 99 studies found a moderate effect size of choice overload (Chernev et al., 
2015). Specifically, larger assortments, relative to smaller assortments, were not only found to 
produce greater choice deferral and switching likelihood, but induce greater post-decisional 
dissatisfaction, uncertainty, and regret. These negative subjective evaluations of individuals’ 
choices are at least somewhat rooted in reality, as choosing from large choice sets also yields 
objectively poorer decisions (e.g. Hanoch et al., 2009; Tanius et al., 2009; Botti & Hsee, 2010). 
For instance, Tanius et al. (2009) found that both younger and older adults chose worse (e.g., 
more expensive, less convenient) prescription drug plans when choosing from a larger choice set 
compared to a smaller choice set.  
Motivational Accounts of Choice Overload 
Despite substantial support for these negative choice overload outcomes, there is 
considerably less consensus in the literature for the motivational states occurring during its 
experience. For instance, Reed and colleagues (2011) argued that choice overload situations are 
demotivating due to perceived search costs (e.g., time, risk, and effort associated with choosing 
from many options). Specifically, when individuals anticipate that making a choice will be 
difficult or taxing (e.g., when there are a large number of choices), they should place less value 
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on making that choice, resulting in decreased motivation. However, the experience of choice 
overload could also result in decisions appearing more subjectively valuable and self-relevant, 
resulting in increased motivation. Being presented with many options makes the opportunity to 
find a choice that communicates unique information about the self seem ampler, which in turn 
could make the selection process appear more diagnostic of one’s personal characteristics. In 
contrast, with fewer options to choose from, the constraints of the choice set may limit the extent 
to which one’s choice seems to reveal important characteristics. Consistent with this logic, 
research demonstrates that having more choices increases the degree to which individuals 
perceive their decision as indicating more about who they are as a person (Cheek & Schwartz, 
2017). Relatedly, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found that people reported feeling more personally 
responsible for their choice when selecting from many options versus few options. Counter to a 
demotivating choice overload perspective, these findings suggest that having more options 
should increase the degree to which people view their decision as a statement about their 
identity, even when the domain of the choice itself is relatively mundane in nature (e.g., types of 
chocolate; Schwartz, 2010). 
In addition to questions regarding the subjective value or self-relevance of one’s choice, 
there is also ambiguity in terms of how individuals evaluate their ability to make a good decision 
from many options versus few options. Although individuals initially hold higher expectations 
for the quality of their decision when presented with large choice sets versus small choice sets 
(Diehl & Poyner, 2010), they ultimately hold lower evaluations about their decision quality after-
the-fact, suggesting that they may not feel capable of making a good choice in this context. 
Because past work has largely focused separately on the factors leading people to prefer many 
options at the outset versus on the post-decisional outcomes of making a choice from these 
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options, it is unclear whether decision expectations shift from relatively positive to relatively 
negative during the choice overload experience, or if they remain uniformly negative (or 
positive) throughout. If it is the case that decision expectations shift over the course of the choice 
overload experience, it is unclear at what point such a shift might occur. For instance, it is 
theoretically plausible that individuals may feel capable of making a good decision when initially 
reviewing a large choice set, but may ultimately feel less capable when faced with the task of 
forming that decision. 
Taken together, there remain important theoretical questions regarding individuals’ 
motivational states during the choice overload experience; specifically: the extent to which 
exposure to many options leads individuals to (1) perceive their decision as subjectively valuable 
or self-relevant and (2) perceive themselves as capable of reaching a good, reasoned decision. 
Using psychophysiological measures from the perspective of the biopsychosocial model of 
challenge/threat (BPSC/T), we explored the nature and timing of individuals’ motivational states 
during choice overload without interrupting their experience for self-reflection. The BPSC/T is 
particularly useful for addressing these questions, as it focuses specifically on individuals’ 
momentary evaluations along these key motivational dimensions: subjective value or self-
relevance (indicated by cardiovascular responses of task engagement) and perceived resources to 
manage situational demands (indicated by cardiovascular responses of challenge/threat).  
The Biopsychosocial Model of Challenge/Threat 
 The BPSC/T (Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Seery, 2011, 2013; Seery 
& Quinton, 2016) applies to motivated performance situations in which individuals actively 
perform instrumental responses to reach self-relevant goals (e.g., making a personally relevant 
decision). In this context, individuals’ level of task engagement represents the degree to which 
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the goal is perceived to be subjectively valuable or self-relevant, with greater task engagement 
corresponding to perceiving a goal as more subjectively valuable or self-relevant. Given task 
engagement, evaluations of personal resources and situational demands determine the extent to 
which individuals experience psychological states of challenge versus threat. Challenge occurs 
when individuals’ evaluations of personal resources are relatively high and their evaluations of 
task demands are relatively low. Conversely, threat occurs when individuals evaluate task 
demands as being relatively high and personal resources as being relatively low. Despite these 
discrete labels, challenge and threat represent two anchors of a single bipolar continuum, such 
that greater challenge corresponds to feeling more capable of managing situational demands, 
whereas greater threat corresponds to feeling less capable of managing situational demands. 
Relative differences in challenge/threat (i.e., greater vs. lesser challenge) are meaningful and 
reflect the basis for hypotheses. 
In total, four cardiovascular measures are used to index task engagement and 
challenge/threat during motivated performance situations: heart rate (HR); ventricular 
contractility (VC), a measure of the left ventricle’s contractile force (pre-ejection period 
reactivity × −1); cardiac output (CO), the amount of blood pumped by the heart; and total 
peripheral resistance (TPR), a measure of net constriction versus dilation in the arterial system. 
Task engagement is thought to result in an increase in sympathetic-adrenomedullary axis 
activation and thus increases in HR and VC from baseline, which are common across the 
challenge/threat continuum (Seery 2011, 2013). Manipulations that should heighten goal self-
relevance or value and thus task engagement (e.g., presence of an audience, monetary incentive) 
have been shown to lead to larger increases in these cardiovascular markers (e.g., Blascovich, 
Mendes, Hunter, & Salomon, 1999; Seery, Weisbuch, & Blascovich, 2009; also see Fowles, 
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Fisher, & Tranel, 1982; Tranel, Fisher, & Fowles, 1982; for additional discussion, see Seery, 
2013), supporting that relatively greater task engagement leads to relatively greater increases in 
HR and VC. Given task engagement, challenge is thought to lead to greater release of 
epinephrine than threat, which yields relative dilation in arteries supplying skeletal muscles with 
blood (e.g., in the arms and legs), thereby facilitating the heart in pumping more blood (Seery 
2011, 2013). Challenge is thus marked by lower TPR and higher CO than threat, such that 
relatively lower TPR and higher CO reflect relatively greater challenge or lesser threat. These 
cardiovascular responses do not equate to challenge/threat itself, but instead represent a measure 
of the underlying psychological state.  
The theoretical underpinnings of these cardiovascular patterns stem from Dienstbier’s 
(1989) model of psychophysiological toughness; specifically, differential activation of the 
sympathetic-adrenomedullary (SAM) and pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA or PAC) axes. 
Challenge and threat are both hypothesized to result in heightened SAM activation, but threat is 
believed to also result in heightened HPA activation, the early stages of which may inhibit the 
epinephrine-mediated vasodilation that would otherwise occur (Seery, 2011). The validity of 
these cardiovascular markers has been supported by dozens of studies, which assessed or 
manipulated challenge/threat states in various ways (e.g., Moore, Vine, Wilson, & Freeman, 
2012, 2014; Moore, Wilson, Vine, Coussens, & Freeman, 2013; Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers, & 
Sassenberg, 2012; Shimizu, Seery, Weisbuch, & Lupien, 2011; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & 
Leitten, 1993; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997; Turner, Jones, Sheffield, Barker, & 
Coffee, 2014; Weisbuch-Remington, Mendes, Seery, & Blascovich, 2005; for reviews, see 
Blascovich, 2008; Seery, 2013). Not only has past work directly manipulated resource-demand 
evaluations to examine cardiovascular markers of challenge/threat (Moore et al., 2012; 2013; 
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O’Connor, Arnold, & Maruizio, 2010), but correlational studies have examined these 
associations using self-report resource-demand pre-task evaluations (Moore et al., 2017; Tomaka 
et al., 1993, 1997; Turner et al., 2013; Vine et al., 2013; Zanstra, Johnston, & Rabash, 2010). 
Past work has also assessed or manipulated other psychological constructs that should affect 
resources-demand evaluations, including self-esteem, social anxiety, task framing, and social 
power (e.g., Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2012; Shimizu, Seery, Weisbuch, & 
Lupien, 2011; Seery, Blascovich, Weisbuch, & Vick, 2004; Weisbuch-Remington, Mendes, 
Seery, & Blascovich, 2005). For instance, instilling participants with feelings of high social 
power, which is a state defined by the ability to control or possess resources (suggesting high 
resource evaluations; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2008), has been shown to predict 
cardiovascular responses consistent with greater relative challenge. High social anxiety should 
equate to evaluating low resources and high demands in social situations. Consistent with this, 
Shimizu et al. (2011) found that women higher in social anxiety exhibited cardiovascular 
responses consistent with greater relative threat. Importantly, the various methods and designs 
used to capture resource-demand evaluations have been shown to similarly predict emotional, 
cognitive, physiological, and behavioral responses during motivated performance situations, with 
greater challenge broadly resulting in more positive performance outcomes than greater threat 
(for a systematic review, see Hase, O’Brien, Moore, & Freeman, 2018).  
Notably, resource-demand evaluations are thought to be relatively dynamic in nature (see 
Quigley et al., 2002), such that as circumstances change, initial relative challenge could 
transition to relative threat, initial relative threat could transition to relative challenge, or either 
state could shift to disengagement from the task and thus neither challenge nor threat (Seery, 
2013). This dynamic nature of resource-demands evaluations should be particularly relevant for 
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the current research question. Past work shows that individuals initially hold positive 
expectations for their choice quality when selecting from many options (Diehl & Poyner, 2011), 
but that they ultimately report experiencing more negative outcomes after-the-fact (Chernev et 
al., 2015; Haynes, 2009). Thus, using momentary cardiovascular responses capable of tracking 
shifts in resource-demand evaluations may provide insight into the trajectory of individuals’ 
choice overload experiences as they occur. The challenge/threat approach allowed us to track 
these key underlying motivational states during the choice overload experience, providing an 
important advantage for the current research question. 
Overview and Hypotheses 
By monitoring evaluations of subjective value or self-relevance (indicated by 
cardiovascular responses of task engagement) and perceived capabilities to meet situational 
demands (indicated by cardiovascular responses of challenge/threat) during various phases of a 
decision task, the BPSC/T allowed us to test plausible and distinct motivational accounts for 
choice overload as it occurred. For cardiovascular responses of task engagement, competing 
hypotheses for choice overload seemed plausible given prior research. First, if the difficulty of 
facing many options leads people to place low subjective value on their decision (i.e., evaluate a 
decision-making task as lacking self-relevance), the experience of choice overload (compared to 
non-choice overload conditions) should result in cardiovascular responses consistent with 
relatively low task engagement (relatively low HR and VC). However, if having many options 
leads people to view their decision as a statement about their identity (Schwartz, 2010), choice 
overload should instead lead individuals to feel as though the decision holds high self-relevance 
and subjective value, resulting in cardiovascular responses consistent with greater task 
engagement than when having few options (higher HR and VC). 
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In terms of cardiovascular responses of challenge/threat, competing hypotheses seemed 
once again plausible given prior research, particularly for the initial stages of the choice overload 
experience (i.e., when reviewing options before the choice). When options are ample rather than 
scarce, it may be the case that participants perceive their ability to make a good, reasoned choice 
to be relatively high at the outset. Thus, being presented with a large choice set may initially lead 
participants to evaluate high resources and low demands, resulting in the experience of relative 
challenge and corresponding cardiovascular responses (high CO, low TPR). This possibility 
would be consistent with past work demonstrating that people hold higher expectations for the 
quality of their decision when they are initially presented with many options rather than few 
(Diehl & Poyner, 2010). Alternatively, it may be the case that participants feel that they lack the 
time and ability to fully evaluate many options and thus meet their expectations early in the 
decision process. In other words, even when initially evaluating their options before a choice, 
those who are exposed to many options may already evaluate holding relatively low personal 
resources to meet the demands associated with making this choice, resulting in relative threat 
throughout (low CO, high TPR). Although competing hypotheses seemed plausible for the initial 
decision stages, we hypothesized that choice overload should eventually result in greater relative 
threat in the latter stages of the decision experience (i.e., while making a decision). At this point, 
individuals should perceive that they do not have the time and ability to make a good decision 
from the large set of options provided to them (i.e., evaluating low resources and high demands). 
Given these possible divergences across the different stages of choice overload, it was crucial to 
our hypotheses to separately examine cardiovascular responses measured (1) while participants 
evaluated their options and (2) while participants actually made their decision.  
Experiments 
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Overview 
We conducted two psychophysiological experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) and  
one follow-up non-psychophysiological experiment (Experiment 3) to examine individuals’ 
momentary experiences during a choice task, as well as evaluations of their choice after-the-fact. 
Specifically, in Experiments 1 and 2, we assessed cardiovascular responses of task engagement 
and challenge/threat while participants evaluated and selected from a series of choice options. 
The primary goals of Experiments 1 and 2 were to maximally highlight these cardiovascular 
responses, and as a result, our paradigm diverged minorly from those used in previous choice 
overload research (see Procedures for additional information). Thus, in Experiment 3, we utilized 
a non-psychophysiological approach to help dispel any potential concerns with the 
generalizability of our paradigm to other choice overload scenarios, placing specific focus on 
self-report assessment of individuals’ choice overload experiences. Taken together, our multi-
modal approach not only allowed us to capture momentary choice overload experiences without 
interruption, but also helped generate support that our manipulation did in fact create the 
experience of choice overload as defined in previous work. 
 All three experiments used a four-cell design to test hypotheses. The four conditions 
included: (1) a 15-option, final choice condition; (2) a 4-option, final choice condition; (3) a 15-
option, rating condition; and (4) a 15-option, reversible choice condition. In the 15-option, final 
choice condition (i.e., the prototypical choice overload condition), participants were asked to 
make a final selection from 15 options (large set). Consistent with Chernev et al.’s (2015) review 
and other paradigms used in the choice overload literature (Goodman & Malkoc, 2012; Haynes, 
2009; Sela et al., 2009), the prototypical choice overload condition was designed to optimally 
induce this experience by giving participants limited time (high decision difficulty) to choose 
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among many similarly rated (high decision complexity) and novel (high preference uncertainty) 
options.  
Each of the other three conditions were designed to reduce the likelihood of experiencing 
choice overload and/or influence components of the paradigm relevant to perceived subjective 
value or capability during the task. For instance, in the 4-option, final choice condition (from 
here on, referred to as the 4-option condition), participants were asked to make a final selection, 
but only chose from a mere 4 options (small set), making it unlikely for choice overload to occur 
(Chernev, 2003; Chernev et al., 2015; Goodman & Malkoc, 2012; Haynes, 2009; Sela et al., 
2009). In the 15-option, rating condition (from here on, referred to as the rating condition), 
participants were provided 15 options (large set), but did not actually choose among these 
options. Instead, participants were asked to provide an overall rating of the set. This condition 
created a paradigm that was functionally similar to the prototypical choice overload condition in 
terms of the amount of stimuli presented, but again was unlikely to induce choice overload 
because participants were not making a choice. Finally, in the 15-option, reversible choice 
condition, participants were asked to make a tentative choice from many options that could be 
changed later. Although this condition should still induce the experience of choice overload, the 
finality of one’s decision could reasonably impact the degree to which a choice is perceived as 
subjectively valuable or the degree to which one feels capable of managing it. Compared to a 
choice that need be final, a tentative choice may lead individuals to view their decision as 
relatively unimportant or more easily managed. Thus, this reversible choice condition was 
included to isolate the specific impact of decision finality on these motivational dimensions 
during choice overload. 
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Because all three experiments utilized the same design and choice overload paradigm, we 
depart from the historical norm to present each individually. Following recommendations to use 
meta-analysis to evaluate replicability (Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014; Chan & Arvey, 
2012; Fabrigar & Wegener, 2016; Goh et al., 2016; Stroebe, 2016), we present our experiments 
collectively. First, we discuss the participants, methods, and measures used across experiments. 
We then discuss the meta-analytic results for our psychophysiological measurements (N=232) 
and for our self-report measurements (N=494). We treat the experiments as a cumulative model 
test to ensure that we interpret only statistically robust effects.  
Method 
Participants. Across all three experiments, a total of 494 introductory psychology 
students (292 women) participated in return for partial course credit and were included in 
analyses (104 participants in Experiment 1 analyses; 128 participants in Experiment 2 analyses; 
and 262 participants in Experiment 3 analyses). In a typical study with our set of cardiovascular 
measures, approximately 10-15 percent of the sample may be lost due to recording problems. In 
addition to the 104 participants in Experiment 1, 10 participants were excluded from analyses for 
this reason: 4 due to missing or unusable blood pressure readings, 5 due to unusable impedance 
cardiography data, and 1 due to a participant’s heart condition. An additional 20 participants 
were excluded from Experiment 1 because of other reasons: 16 due to failure to follow 
instructions (e.g., not speaking aloud during the task; 14 of these 16 were non-native English 
speakers who may have struggled with comprehension, an issue addressed in Experiment 2), 3 
due to participant withdrawal, and 1 due to technological malfunction. In Experiment 2, we 
restricted our sample only to individuals who were native English speakers to reduce 
noncompliance with instructions. In addition to the 128 participants in Experiment 2, 20 
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participants were excluded from analyses due to cardiovascular recording problems: 11 due to 
missing or unusable blood pressure readings, 8 due to unusable impedance cardiography data, 
and 1 due to unusable ECG data. An additional 14 participants were excluded from Experiment 2 
because of other reasons: 5 due to failure to follow directions (e.g., not speaking aloud during the 
task), 4 due to technological malfunction, 2 due to knowledge about the study prior to 
participation, 1 due to a close relationship with the experimenter, 1 due to skin problems that 
prevented proper application of cardiovascular sensors, and 1 due to fainting during the study. 
Finally, in addition to the 262 participants included in Experiment 3 analyses, 6 participants were 
not included in analyses due to exiting the study prior to completing the dependent measures of 
interest. Importantly, exclusions did not vary significantly by condition in Experiment 1, χ2 (3, N 
= 104) = .923, p = .820, Experiment 2, χ2 (3, N = 125) = 1.37, p = .71, or Experiment 3, χ2 (3, N 
= 262) = 3.56, p = .31. Further, each condition in Experiment 1 contained at least 24 participants 
(104 total participants), each condition in Experiment 2 contained at least 28 participants (128 
total participants), and each condition in Experiment 3 contained at least 58 participants (262 
total participants).  
As stated previously, there were two time periods during which cardiovascular responses 
were measured in Experiments 1 and 2: while participants reviewed the options to be 
rated/chosen from (profile-viewing period) and while participants subsequently stated their 
rating/choice aloud (decision period). All participants in the retained samples had useable data 
for the profile-viewing period, but ten total participants (7 participants in Experiment 1, and 3 
participants in Experiment 2) lacked usable blood pressure data for the decision period. For this 
reason, these participants could not be included in analyses for the decision period. Again, for 
analyses examining the decision period, exclusions did not differ significantly by condition in 
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Experiment 1, χ2 (3, N = 97) = 1.60, p = .660, or Experiment 2, χ2 (3, N = 125) = 1.37, p = .71, 
and each condition in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 contained at least 21 and 26 participants, 
respectively. In total, 97 participants had usable challenge/threat data in Experiment 1, and 125 
participants had usable challenge/threat data in Experiment 2.  
Our original sample size in Experiment 1 was based on attaining at least 25 participants 
per condition after typical exclusions, limited by available laboratory resources. The final sample 
sizes of 104 participants (profile viewing period) and 97 participants (decision period) should 
have provided adequate power (.80) to detect approximate effect sizes of  η  = .077 and η  = 
.083, respectively. In Experiment 2, we based our sample size on the observed effect size for the 
comparison between the 15-option, final choice condition and the 4-option condition from 
Experiment 1 (η  = .058). We targeted a useable sample of 130 to provide power = .80 to detect 
an effect of this magnitude. The final sample sizes of 128 participants (profile-viewing period) 
and 125 participants (decision period) fell slightly short due to exclusions surpassing 
oversampling, but should nonetheless have provided adequate power (> .80) to detect an 
approximate effect size of η 	= .06. In Experiment 3, the sample size was determined using the 
effect size across self-report outcomes between the 15-option, final choice and 4-option 
conditions in Experiments 1 and 2. The final sample size of 262 should have provided adequate 
power (> .80) to detect an approximate effect size of  η  = .03. For each experiment, results were 
not analyzed until after data collection was complete.  
Cardiovascular measures (Experiments 1 and 2). Cardiovascular measures were 
recorded noninvasively, using accepted guidelines (Sherwood et al., 1990). We used the 
following equipment manufactured and/or distributed by Biopac Systems, Inc (Goleta, CA): 
NICO100C impedance cardiography (ICG) noninvasive cardiac output module, ECG100C 
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electrocardiogram (ECG) amplifier, and NIBP100A/B noninvasive blood pressure module. ICG 
signals were detected with a tetrapolar aluminum/mylar tape electrode system, recording basal 
transthoracic impedance (Z0) and the first derivative of impedance change (dZ/dt), sampled at 
1kHz. Using a Standard Lead II electrode configuration (additional spot electrodes on the right 
arm and left leg, with ground provided by the ICG system), ECG signals were detected and 
sampled at 1kHz. The blood pressure monitor was wrist-mounted, collecting continual readings 
(every 10-15 seconds) from the radial artery of participants’ nondominant arm. Together, ICG 
and ECG recordings allowed computation of HR, VC (i.e., pre-ejection period reactivity×-1), 
and CO. Blood pressure data was used to compute TPR (mean arterial pressure×80/CO; 
Sherwood et al., 1990). Recorded measurements of cardiovascular function were stored on a 
computer and analyzed off-line with Biopac Acqknowledge 3.9.2 for Macintosh software, 
following techniques from previously published challenge/threat research (e.g., Seery, Kondrak, 
Streamer, Saltsman, & Lamarche, 2016; also see Lupien, Seery, & Almonte, 2012; Shimizu et 
al., 2011), including ensemble averaging in 60 s intervals (Kelsey & Guethlein, 1990). This 
approach is comparable to techniques used in other challenge/threat work with different 
equipment configurations (e.g., de Wit, Scheepers, & Jehn, 2012; Jamieson, Nock, and Mendes, 
2012; Kassam, Koslov, & Mendes, 2009; Turner et al., 2013; Vine, Freeman, Moore, Chandra-
Ramanan, & Wilson, 2013). Scoring of cardiovascular data was performed blind to condition and 
other participant data.  
Procedure (Experiments 1 and 2). Participants completed the study individually. After 
the administration of questionnaires unrelated to the current research question1 and attachment of 
physiological sensors, participants sat quietly for a 5-minute resting baseline period. Following 
this baseline period, recorded instructions explained that participants would be viewing a series 
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of online personal profiles and would later be asked to report—depending on condition—an 
overall rating of the profiles or a final or non-final choice regarding their most preferred profile. 
As described previously, there were four conditions: 15-option, final choice; 4-option, final 
choice; 15-option, rating; and 15-option, reversible choice. The nature of participants’ task (i.e., 
whether they would be providing a final or non-final choice or a rating) was explained to 
participants before viewing the profiles and was reiterated before they reported their decision or 
rating. Participants were provided a small envelope of laminated cards, each card representing 
one profile. All profiles were labeled with an identification number printed in the top left corner, 
and each contained five “facts” about the profile target (created by the research team). These 
facts covered a wide array of life domains, including academics (e.g., “I’m getting my bachelor’s 
degree in architecture”), occupation (e.g., “I work at a bakery”), and leisure activities (e.g., “I’m 
addicted to medical dramas”). To help create profiles that were similar in terms of general 
likability and appeal, the five facts on each profile were matched with one another using a 
random number generator. We also used a random number generator to determine which profiles 
would be presented in the small set and the large set.2  
In order to elicit challenge/threat responses, the choice task was designed to be 
reasonably motivating and self-relevant across conditions. Not only was the domain of the 
profile task expected to seem relatively important to individuals (interpersonal relationships), but 
instructions for completing the task were targeted toward further ensuring overall increases in 
measures of task engagement from baseline. Although rare in the choice overload literature, 
instructions asked participants to voice their attitudes and impressions aloud while viewing the 
personal profiles, as well as explained to participants that their opinions about other people imply 
a great deal about who they are (e.g., their morals, values, and character). Participants were told 
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they should be thinking about the qualities they find most important and appealing when 
considering potential friends, roommates, or romantic partners. In all conditions of both 
experiments, participants were provided 3 minutes to view the profiles as their cardiovascular 
responses were assessed. Importantly, the number of profiles and amount of content provided on 
each (15 profiles averaging roughly 34 words in length in the choice overload condition) was 
based primarily on work by Haynes (2009), which used a similar time duration to examine 
choice overload (approximately 2.5 minutes to assess 10 options with 50-60 word descriptions 
for each option).   
Once the 3-minute period ended, participants were told to verbally report their decision or 
rating aloud to the experimenter. Experiments 1 and 2 diverged minorly from one another at this 
point in the study procedures. In Experiment 1, participants were simply asked to report their 
decision or rating out loud, which required an average of approximately 27 seconds to report (M 
= 27.13, SD = 26.77). For this reason, some participants were left with single blood pressure 
readings and seven with no useable readings during the decision period (requiring excluding 
their data). Because our continual blood pressure recording instruments allow for a maximum of 
six distinct readings per minute, task periods that are at least 1 minute in length increase the 
likelihood of recording multiple readings, thus heightening reliability. For this reason, in 
Experiment 2, we altered instructions to encourage participants to use 1 full minute to report 
their choice, thereby increasing the number of blood pressure readings. Rather than simply being 
asked to state their decision/rating aloud, participants were asked to justify and explain their 
decision/rating for 60 seconds. Participants were encouraged to speak for the full amount of time. 
If participants stopped speaking for at least 10 seconds, the experimenter prompted them to 
continue speaking. 
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After reporting their decision, participants in both experiments then completed a final 
series of nine self-report items assessing negative post-decisional outcomes consistent with 
choice overload: satisfaction (1 item: “How satisfied are you with your decision-making 
process?”, reverse-scored), regret (1 item: “How much do you regret how you went about the 
decision-making process?”), confidence (1 item: “How confident are you in your decision-
making process?”, reverse-scored), difficulty (1 item: “How difficult did you find this task?”), 
desire to change decision (2 items: “If given the opportunity to change your decision, how likely 
would you be to change it?”, “How much do you want to change your decision?”), and 
frustration/enjoyment (3 items: “How frustrating did you find this task?”; “How much did you 
enjoy this task?”, reverse-scored; “How much would you want to do this task again?”, reverse-
scored). Items were assessed on a scale ranging from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Very. All physiological 
sensors were then removed before participants were debriefed and thanked.  
Procedure (Experiment 3). Participants were exposed to an online version of the choice 
overload manipulation used in Experiments 1 and 2. The online manipulation was identical to the 
psychophysiological experiments in nearly every regard, except participants were not instructed 
to speak during the task. Further, because there were no physical profile cards to maneuver and 
organize as participants saw fit, profile cards in the online study were presented in random order 
and displayed one-by-one vertically down the webpage. Similar to the laboratory paradigm, 
cards were presented in a way that suggested they should be read one at a time, but also provided 
the flexibility to refer back to a previous card, as well as view multiple cards at once. Overall, 
this presentation was designed to parallel the experiences created by the laboratory paradigm as 
closely as possible.  
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After exposure to the manipulation, participants completed a 4-item measure of choice 
overload (Lau, Hiemisch, & Baumeister, 2015), as well as the 9-item measure used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. The 4-item measure of choice overload assessed the degree to which 
participants felt overwhelmed, exhausted, and under pressure by their decision, as well as how 
difficult it was to keep all of the relevant information together. This measure was assessed on an 
11-point scale, ranging from 1 = Not at all to 11 = Completely true.   
Results: Analytical Strategy and Individual Experiments 
 As is standard in challenge/threat research (e.g., Lupien et al., 2012; Scheepers et al., 
2012; Seery, Leo, Lupien, Kondrak, & Almonte, 2013), cardiovascular reactivity values were 
calculated by subtracting responses observed during the last baseline minute from those observed 
during each minute of the 3-minute profile-viewing period (the mean of these three reactivity 
values was used in analyses) and the decision period (see Llabre, Spitzer, Saab, Ironson, & 
Schneiderman, 1991, for psychometric justification for the use of change scores in 
psychophysiology). For extreme reactivity values greater than 3.3 SDs from the mean (p = .001 
in a normal distribution; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996), we winsorized values by adjusting each to 
be 1% above the next-highest nonextreme value (Experiment 1: for the profile-viewing period, 1 
value for CO and 3 values for TPR; for the decision period, 1 value each for CO and TPR; 
Experiment 2: for the profile-viewing period, 1 value for CO and 4 values for TPR; for the 
decision period, 1 value for CO and 2 values for TPR). There were no such cases for HR or VC 
reactivity. This winsorizing process maintained the rank order in the distribution while 
decreasing the influence of extreme values. Theoretically, changes in TPR and CO should reflect 
the same underlying physiological activation and indicate relative differences in challenge/threat. 
Thus, TPR and CO reactivity values were combined into a single index for the profile-viewing 
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period and, separately, the decision period (e.g., Blascovich, Seery, Mugridge, Norris, & 
Weisbuch, 2004; de Wit, Scheepers, & Jehn, 2012; Seery, Weisbuch, & Blascovich, 2009). This 
served to (1) maximize the reliability of the cardiovascular measures, analogous to averaging 
over multiple items on a self-report scale; and (2) assess the relative pattern across TPR and CO 
within participants (e.g., differentiating between individuals with high TPR and low CO vs. those 
with high TPR and moderate CO). In each psychophysiological experiment, we first converted 
participants’ TPR and CO reactivity values into z-scores and then summed reverse-scored TPR 
with CO (i.e., TPR was multiplied by -1 because TPR and CO should respond in opposite 
directions), such that lower index values represented cardiovascular reactivity consistent with 
greater threat. The resulting index was then standardized for ease of interpretation (M = 0, SD = 
1). Importantly, differences on this index are relative, such that the zero point represents the 
sample mean rather than a demarcation point between challenge versus threat.  
Because increases in HR and VC during task performance are prerequisites for both 
challenge and threat cardiovascular patterns, it was important to confirm that participants as a 
whole exhibited significant increases from baseline in HR and VC during both the profile-
viewing period and the decision period. In Experiment 1 and 2, one-sample t tests revealed that 
HR and VC reactivity were significantly greater than zero during the profile-viewing period, all 
ts > 4.41, ps < .001. Establishing this evidence for task engagement justified testing for relative 
differences in challenge/threat responses. Once established, HR and VC were also combined into 
a single index by summing their z-scores to examine differences in task engagement across 
conditions. The resulting index was standardized, with zero representing the sample mean rather 
than baseline levels. See Table 1and Table 2 for a correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for 
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all individual and composite measures in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, as well as Table 3 
for unadjusted cell means and standard deviations for each experiment.3 
Across all analyses (including both psychophysiological and self-report measures), 
planned contrasts compared the prototypical choice overload condition (i.e., the 15-option, final 
choice condition) to each of the three other conditions. Because of our interests in different 
stages of the choice overload experience, we separately examined these planned contrasts for 
cardiovascular responses of task engagement and challenge/threat during (1) the profile-viewing 
period4 and (2) the decision period. For each experiment, we tested effects of condition using 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) and covariance (ANCOVA) for each dependent measure. For 
each of the dependent measures, we calculated Fisher’s Zr for the contrast observed (i.e., 15-
option, final choice vs. each other condition) and then tested the mean weighted value of Zr 
across samples. Although we report our results as a collective, Table 4 contains results for each 
individual experiment.  
Meta-Analysis 
Task Engagement 
  Across the two psychophysiological experiments, individuals in the 15-option, final 
choice condition exhibited cardiovascular responses consistent with greater task engagement 
compared to those in the 4-option and rating conditions, but not to those in the 15-option, 
reversible choice condition. Specifically, during the profile-viewing period, the task engagement 
index in the 15-option, final choice condition was significantly higher than it was in the 4-option 
condition, r = -.187, z = -2.83, p = .005, 95% CI [-.318, -.058], and in the rating condition, r = -
.176, z = -2.62, p =.008, 95% CI [-.305, -.044]. However, the parallel difference relative to the 
15-option, reversible choice condition did not reach significance, r = -.109, z = -1.64, p = .101, 
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95% CI [-.239, .021]. Similarly, during the decision period, participants in the 15-option, final 
choice condition exhibited significantly higher task engagement than the those in the 4-option 
condition, r = -.225, z = -3.36, p < .001, 95% CI [-.095, -.036], and marginally significantly 
higher task engagement than those in the rating condition, r = -.132, z = -1.96, p = .050, 95% CI 
[-.266, 0]. The parallel difference relative to the 15-option, reversible choice condition did not 
approach significance, r = -.007, z = -.106, p = .928, 95% CI [-.141, .126].5 See Figures 1 and 2 
for effects of condition across experiments during the profile-viewing and decision periods, 
respectively. 
 Overall, task engagement findings suggest that individuals in the 15-option, final choice 
condition (i.e., the prototypical choice overload condition) evaluated the decision task as holding 
more subjective value or self-relevance than did those who chose from 4 options and those who 
rated 15 options. Interestingly, there were no task engagement differences observed between the 
15-option, final choice condition and the 15-option, reversible choice condition, suggesting that 
these conditions did not differ in terms of individuals’ evaluations of subjective value or self-
relevance.  
Challenge/Threat 
 Given observed differences in the task engagement index, analyses for the 
challenge/threat index controlled for task engagement (see below for additional comment). 
Across Experiments 1 and 2, there was also evidence that individuals in the 15-option, final 
choice condition (i.e., the prototypical choice overload condition) tended to exhibit 
cardiovascular responses consistent with greater relative threat compared to those in the 4-option 
condition and the rating condition. Although most prominent during the decision period, the 
prototypical choice overload condition tended to elicit greater relative threat than these 
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conditions throughout the decision-making experience, suggesting that shifts in momentary 
evaluations did not vary systematically over the course of the task.6 Specifically, during the 
profile-viewing period, the challenge/threat index in the 15-option, final choice condition was 
significantly lower (greater threat) than it was in the 4-option condition, r = .165, z = 2.51, p = 
.012, 95% CI [.037, .296]. The parallel difference approached significance relative to the rating 
condition, r = .116, z = 1.76, p = .078, 95% CI [-.013, .246] and the 15-option, reversible choice 
condition, r = .118, z = 1.80, p = .072, 95% CI [-.011, .248]. During the decision period, the 
challenge/threat index in the 15-option, final choice condition was significantly lower (greater 
threat) than in the 4-option condition, r = .207, z = 3.09, p = .002, 95% CI [.077, .343], and in the 
rating condition, r = .212, z = 3.16, p = .002, 95% CI [.082, .348]. The parallel difference relative 
to the 15-option, reversible choice condition did not reach significance, r = .112, z = 1.66, p = 
.098, 95% CI [-.021, .246]. See Figures 3 and 4 for effects of condition across experiments 
during the profile-viewing and decision periods, respectively. 
Overall, our findings indicate that participants in the 15-option, final choice condition, 
compared to those in the 4-option and rating conditions, exhibited cardiovascular responses 
consistent with evaluating relatively low resources to meet the demands of the choice task. In 
other words, both while reviewing the profiles and while reporting a decision, those in the 
prototypical choice overload condition exhibited cardiovascular responses consistent with feeling 
less capable of managing their decision than did those in the 4-option and rating conditions. 
Similar to our task engagement findings, there were no differences in challenge/threat responses 
between the 15-option, final choice condition and the 15-option, reversible choice conditions. 
Importantly, we included the task engagement index as a covariate in all challenge/threat 
analyses, ensuring that any observed differences were specific to challenge/threat and not due to 
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reactivity in general. Because task engagement is a component of challenge/threat, it would 
otherwise be possible that parallel findings for task engagement and challenge/threat could 
actually be explained by task engagement alone, such as if the greatest task engagement co-
occurred with the most extreme challenge/threat. The same overall pattern of results emerged 
without this covariate, as well as when HR and VC were included separately as covariates in 
each model.  
Self-Report Measures 
We assessed self-report measures across all three independent samples. Overall, we 
found that those in the 15-option, final choice condition reported experiencing greater overall 
choice overload relative to those in the 4-option condition, r = -.129, z = -2.86, p = .004, 95% CI 
[-.129, -.216].7 The parallel differences did not reach significance relative to the rating condition, 
r = -.044, z = -0.968, p = .333, 95% CI [-.132, .045], or the 15-option, reversible choice 
condition, r = .044, z = 1.10, p = .272, 95% CI [-.039, .138]. Notably, the magnitude of effect 
size between the 15-option, final choice condition and the 4-option condition is comparable to 
those found in the broader choice overload meta-analysis conducted by Chernev et al. (2015). 
General Discussion 
Although ample evidence exists for choice overload’s negative subjective (e.g., greater 
regret and dissatisfaction; Haynes, 2009; Markus & Schwartz, 2013; Schwartz, 2004) and 
objective outcomes (e.g., poorer decision quality), there is uncertainty regarding how choice 
overload impacts two key motivational dimensions: (1) the extent to which people view their 
decision as subjectively valuable (versus not), and (2) the extent to which people view 
themselves as capable (versus incapable) of reaching a good decision in this context. The current 
work used a psychophysiological approach to observe these key motivational dimensions during 
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a choice overload paradigm that closely adhered to past work (e.g., Chernev et al., 2015; 
Chernev & Hamilton, 2009; Haynes, 2009; Iyenger & Lepper, 2000; Sela, Berger, & Liu, 2009) 
and replicated choice overload effects. Specifically, results of a meta-analysis demonstrated that 
participants in the 15-option, final choice condition reported significantly greater choice overload 
than those in the 4-option condition, suggesting that our paradigm created choice overload as 
conceptualized in previous research.8  
Using the perspective of the BPSC/T, we used a constellation of cardiovascular measures 
to continuously monitor the degree to which individuals perceived a choice as subjectively 
valuable or self-relevant (indicating cardiovascular responses of task engagement), and the extent 
to which they perceived holding the resources to manage this decision (indicating cardiovascular 
responses of challenge/threat). Despite work arguing that choosing from many options 
(compared to few) should result in a decision seeming less subjectively valuable or less 
important, the current studies found no evidence for this hypothesis (i.e., lower task 
engagement). Instead, a meta-analysis across two experiments found that participants who made 
a final selection from many options exhibited cardiovascular responses consistent with greater 
task engagement than did those who made a selection from few options or who rated many 
options. Although emerging most consistently while reporting their choice, we also found that 
participants who made a final selection from many options, relative to those who chose from few 
or who rated many, exhibited cardiovascular responses consistent with greater threat throughout 
the decision experience. The meta-analysis failed to show compelling support for reliable 
differences between the 15-option, final and reversible choice conditions, suggesting that 
decision finality may not be a central factor in shaping individuals’ momentary experience of 
choice overload.  
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High task engagement is consistent with evaluating the decision as highly self-relevant, 
which supports the hypothesis that choice overload may lead to decisions seeming more self-
expressive or self-revealing (see Cheek & Schwartz, 2017). Threat is consistent with evaluating 
low resources and high demands (Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Seery, 2011, 
2013; Seery & Quinton, 2016), and given the similarity in results across profile and decision 
periods, this supports the hypothesis that individuals do not actually feel capable of making a 
good, reasoned decision throughout the choice overload experience (despite past work arguing 
that they should hold positive expectations at the outset; Diehl & Poyner, 2011). Theoretically, 
this threat should follow from individuals perceiving that they do not possess the time or ability 
to reasonably consider all of their choice options. Seery & Quinton (2016) argued that 
evaluations of likelihood of success or likely degree of success is a core influence on the balance 
of resources/demands. Inadequate time and ability to consider all options should thus lead to 
evaluating relatively low resources/high demands. Given that we found this difference 
throughout both the profile-viewing and decision periods, it suggests that individuals begin 
forming these evaluations in the early stages of their decision process. Importantly, the observed 
effects do not derive simply from the amount of stimuli presented to individuals, as participants 
who made a choice from many options also exhibited greater threat than did those who assigned 
a rating to the same number of options. Further, all challenge/threat analyses were conducted 
controlling for task engagement, ensuring that the observed challenge/threat differences were not 
simply due to differences in reactivity more generally. 
Profile-Viewing Versus Decision Periods 
One explanation for the lack of differences across profile-viewing versus decision periods 
is that because individuals knew their decision goal (final/reversible decision, rating) before they 
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saw any options, they could have started forming a decision during the profile-viewing period, 
thus resulting in similar responses across the viewing and decision periods. Although this is 
possible, three points are worthy of note. First, people typically have an initial goal to make a 
choice before they evaluate specific options, both in the choice overload literature and in 
everyday decision-making more broadly. In studies focusing on individuals’ decision goal, this 
goal is often established prior to participants viewing their options (e.g., Fukukura, Ferguson, & 
Fujita, 2013; Polman, 2012). The fact that this was the case in the current work is consistent with 
capturing the phenomenon of interest. Second, participants in Experiment 1 were only asked to 
state their decision/rating aloud, not justify it. Inconsistent with them having already reached a 
decision during the profile-viewing period, they spent approximately 27 seconds on average 
making their report. Importantly, the 15-option, final choice condition did not significantly differ 
from any of the other conditions in terms of how much time participants required to make their 
decision, Fs < 3.03, ps > .085, ηs < .033, suggesting that individuals across conditions were 
actively making their choice during the decision period. Third, if observed effects of condition 
on challenge/threat depend on the act of deciding rather than viewing options, and individuals 
were deciding during the profile-viewing period, differences between conditions should be 
largest at the end of the viewing period rather than at the beginning. At the beginning of the 
profile-viewing period, participants in all conditions would have required some time to view at 
least some of their options, during which time there would be relatively little opportunity for the 
4-option and 15-option choice and rating conditions to differ. Only later in the period would, for 
example, the 15-option, final choice condition require mentally juggling more simultaneous 
alternatives than the 4-option condition. In contrast to this logic, however, no such differences 
emerged across minutes within the profile-viewing period (see Footnote 4). Although this does 
Page 32 of 63
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
TOO MANY FISH IN THE SEA  32 
 
not rule out the possibility that our findings reflect that participants were actually deciding during 
the viewing period, it suggests that differences observed during the viewing period are 
influenced by anticipating the eventual decision goal, before differential cognitive demands 
associated with various goals have actually been experienced. Future work could more directly 
address this possibility by assessing individuals’ expectations prior to beginning the choice task 
or by manipulating whether or not participants’ choice goals are presented prior to evaluation. 
Limitations and Future Directions  
The current studies are limited in several ways. Although the difference in 
challenge/threat between the 15-option, final and reversible choice conditions was in the 
direction of the final choice yielding greater threat, the meta-analysis failed to show compelling 
support for the reliability of this effect. One possibility is that our manipulation of reversibility 
was too subtle to create an effect detectable with our sample sizes. Relatedly, this lack of 
difference could in part be due to the decision context itself. In order to examine challenge/threat 
responses, it was necessary that the choice paradigm be reasonably motivating and self-relevant 
across conditions. Not only was the domain of the choice task expected to be relatively important 
to individuals (interpersonal relationships), but instructions for completing the task were targeted 
toward further maximizing task engagement (e.g., speaking aloud for the experimenter to hear). 
In this context, it could be the case that even a reversible choice was perceived to suggest a great 
deal of information about the self. Thus, similar to a final choice, a tentative choice in this 
context could lead individuals to view their decision as both relatively important and 
unmanageable. 
This issue points to a broader limitation of this work: Across all studies, we used the 
same choice task to examine our hypotheses. As stated, this paradigm did diverge somewhat 
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from previous choice overload paradigms, as participants were asked to publicly report their 
thoughts about each option, as well as their decision to the experimenter. Although similar think-
aloud paradigms have been used to assess qualitative responses to having many options (e.g., 
Pan & Zhang, 2012; Woll, 1986), public decisions are relatively rare in the choice overload 
literature, and no work to our knowledge has explicitly tested the effect of public versus private 
decisions on the choice overload experience. Experiment 3 did not require participants to speak 
out loud, but still relied on the same decision context (interpersonal relationships). Thus, 
although using this particular choice overload paradigm across studies allowed us to maximize 
cardiovascular reactivity and increase our statistical power across studies, it also limits our 
ability to generalize the current findings to other decision contexts. For instance, it remains 
possible that the motivational processes observed during our choice overload paradigm operate 
differently when individuals are making other kinds of decisions or making their decisions 
privately. The current work cannot speak directly to this possibility; future research should 
explore these motivational processes using different choice paradigms and decision contexts. 
Decision Quality. Although the current work only examined subjective post-decision 
evaluations, integrating past work in both the choice overload and challenge/threat literatures 
regarding objective decision quality could lead to interesting future research. A great deal of 
work in the choice overload literature has focused specifically on decision quality (e.g., Schram 
& Sonnemans, 2011; Tanius et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2011). Schram and Sonnemans (2011), for 
instance, found that an increase in the number of alternatives not only resulted in participants 
considering a lower fraction of available information to make their decision, but decreased the 
objective quality of the decision they made. Similarly, past challenge/threat work has also argued 
that, compared to challenge, the experience of relative threat may result in poorer decision-
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making, as greater threat has been associated with less cognitive flexibility when forming 
decisions. Specifically, individuals exhibiting relative threat made fewer adjustments from self-
generated anchors (Kassam et al., 2009) and demonstrated greater resistance to opposing 
viewpoints (de Wit et al., 2012) than did individuals exhibiting relative challenge. Taken 
together, examining the choice overload experience under a challenge/threat lens may present 
important theoretical implications for both literatures in terms of exploring the objective 
consequences of individuals’ choices. For instance, it could be the case that individuals 
experiencing relative threat are more likely to feel overwhelmed generally when making 
decisions, leading to objectively poorer decision-making strategies. It is also possible that 
challenge/threat responses contribute to differences in decision quality in the face of choice 
overload. Future research could aim to focus more specifically on objective components of 
individuals’ decisions, as well as the subsequent behavioral consequences of overload-induced 
psychological threat. 
Choice Overload: A Motivational Paradox 
Past researchers examining the subjective and behavioral outcomes of choice overload 
have famously termed this experience the “Paradox of Choice.” Our findings depict a similarly 
paradoxical motivational account, extending previous work connecting choice overload to 
identity expression (e.g., Schwartz, 2010; Cheek & Schwartz, 2017). Although previous work 
argued that choosing from many options reduces the subjective value one places on a choice, 
other research suggests that choice overload should make the opportunity to find a choice that 
communicates unique information about one’s identity seem more abundant, making the decision 
appear more valuable or diagnostic of the self. Consistent with this latter theorizing, our findings 
suggest that selecting from many options leads individuals to exhibit cardiovascular responses 
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consistent with greater task engagement, or evaluating their decision as more subjectively 
valuable or self-relevant. Furthermore, despite work demonstrating that people hold relatively 
high expectations for their choice quality when exposed to many options (Diehl & Poyner, 
2010), our results suggest that individuals may feel relatively incapable of making a good choice 
throughout the choice overload experience. Specifically, in addition to greater task engagement, 
our findings indicate that the experience of choosing from many options also leads people to 
exhibit cardiovascular responses consistent with greater threat. This presumably follows from 
evaluating low resources and high demands when attempting to come to a good, reasoned 
decision from among too many options.   
Taken together, the current work expands our understanding of the paradox of choice 
overload. Although much research has focused on its negative downstream outcomes, the 
motivational states occurring during the choice overload experience are less clear. Using 
cardiovascular responses from the perspective of the BPSC/T, we found that choosing from 
many options predicted responses consistent with feeling highly motivated to make a good 
choice, presumably because this choice could reveal or suggest more information about the self. 
At the same time, individuals also appear to feel that they cannot realistically make a good 
selection that adequately represents the self, as they lack the time and ability to reasonably 
consider all of the available options. This combination of momentary experiences may serve as 
the basis for negative downstream choice overload outcomes (e.g., poor decision quality). 
Although future work is needed to explore this possibility, the current research provides novel 
evidence of the inherent motivational paradox that is choice overload. When selecting from 
many options, people simultaneously feel they should—but will not be able to—make a good, 
reasoned decision.  
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Footnotes 
1. For all experiments, we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. Additional 
questionnaires administered at the beginning of Experiments 1 and 2 were the following: 
Maximization Scale, Need for Cognition Scale-Short Form, Almost Perfect Scale-
Revised, Subjective Happiness Scale, Life Orientation Test-Revised, and the Free Will 
and Determinism Scale-Plus (only Experiment 2). 
2. To assess the extent to which profiles were comparably appealing across the 4- and 15-
option conditions, a separate sample of 40 participants evaluated how likely they would 
be to hang out and become friends with the individuals in each profile, as well as the 
degree to which they would enjoy a conversation or a meeting with each individual (α = 
.95). Participants responded to all four items on a scale of 1 = Not at all to 7 = Very 
much. The mean composite ratings for the majority of profiles were at or just above the 
mid-point of this scale (range = 3.94 – 5.06). Paired t-test analyses revealed no significant 
difference between the mean evaluation for the profiles presented in the 4-option 
condition and the mean evaluation for the profiles presented in the 15-option condition, 
t(39) = -0.30, p = .77, η   = .002, 90% CI [0, .072]. Importantly, we also found that the 
standard deviation of composite ratings across profiles within each set did not 
significantly differ, t(39) = 1.21, p = .23, η   = .036, 90% CI [0, .167]. Taken together, 
these pilot data suggest that the two choice sets were comparable in terms of not only 
how positive and appealing the profiles seemed, but how varied these evaluations were 
across profiles.  
3. Although all participants were encouraged to spend the full 3-min profile-viewing period 
speaking aloud, we considered the possibility that condition could have affected speaking 
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activity (e.g., if participants in the 4-option condition spoke less than others), which in 
turn could plausibly affect cardiovascular responses. Four total independent coders (two 
coders per experiment) were asked to assess the degree to which participants spoke 
during the task on a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 representing “the participant was not speaking 
and/or did not seem to understand the task” and 3 representing “the participant is 
speaking throughout the task and is speaking on topic.” With one exception, coders’ 
responses on this item (Experiment 1: r = .609, p < .001; Experiment 2: r = .403, p < 
.001) did not differ as a function of condition in either experiment, ts < 1.58, ps > .116, 
the exception being that participants in the 15-option, final choice condition in 
Experiment 1 were rated as speaking more than those in the 15-option, reversible choice 
condition, t(78) = 2.13, p = .037 (audio/video data were lost for a total of 25 participants 
in Experiment 1 due to equipment malfunction). Importantly, including coders’ ratings as 
a covariate in all analyses did not affect the significance levels or the pattern of responses 
in the meta-analytic results. This suggests that differences in speaking activity cannot 
account for the observed findings. 
4. Across all cardiovascular indices and across both studies, mixed-effects ANOVA models 
revealed no significant interactions between profile-viewing minute (i.e., minutes 1, 2, 
and 3 of the profile-viewing period) and condition in terms of task engagement, Fs < 
1.54, ps > .165, or challenge/threat, Fs < 1.50, ps > .177 (with and without including 
engagement as a covariate). Thus, in order to maximize reliability of our cardiovascular 
measures and to simplify interpretations, we tested the average of the three profile 
minutes in all analyses.  
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5. Using mixed-effects ANOVA models, we found a significant interaction between time 
period (i.e., profile-viewing period vs. decision period) and condition for task 
engagement in Experiment 1, F(3, 94) = 3.37, p = .022, such that task engagement was 
significantly higher during profile-viewing than during the decision period across all 
study conditions, Fs > 7.22, ps < .009, except for the 15-option, reversible choice 
condition, F(1, 94) = .210, p = .649. Similarly, in Experiment 2, we found a significant 
interaction between time period (i.e., profile-viewing period vs. decision period) and 
condition for task engagement, F(3, 121) = 2.95, p = .036, such that task engagement was 
significantly higher during the profile-viewing period than in the decision period for 
those in the 15-option, final choice and 4-option conditions, Fs > 6.77, ps < .010, but not 
for those in the rating and 15-option, reversible choice conditions, Fs < .050, ps > .828. 
In sum, these analyses do not seem to have clear implications for interpreting our primary 
results, and thus, we elected to not examine differences across time in the meta-analysis. 
6. Using mixed-effects ANOVA models, we found no significant interaction between time 
period and condition when predicting challenge/threat responses in isolation in 
Experiment 1 (i.e., without including engagement as a covariate in the model), F(3, 94) = 
1.50, p = .219. When including engagement as a covariate, a significant interaction 
emerged, F(3, 93) = 3.34, p = .023, such that participants in the 4-option condition 
exhibited greater threat during the decision period than the profile-viewing period, F(1, 
93) = 4.75, p = .032, whereas participants in the rating condition exhibited greater threat 
during the profile-viewing period, F(1, 93) = 8.19, p = .005. For the 15-option, final 
choice and 15-option, reversible choice conditions, there were no significant differences 
between challenge/threat responses across time periods, Fs < .66, p > .42. In Experiment 
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2, we found no significant interactions between time period and condition when 
predicting challenge/threat responses (with and without including engagement as a 
covariate), Fs < 1.12, ps > .346. In sum, these analyses do not seem to have clear 
implications for interpreting our primary results, and thus, we elected to not examine 
differences across time in the meta-analysis. 
7. Although we included all 13 items (α = .87) used in Study 3 in the meta-analysis, the 
difference between the 15-option, final choice condition and the 4-option condition was 
also significant when only including the 9-item measure (α = .79) used in all three 
samples, r = -.090, z = -2.00, p = .046, 95% CI [-.178, -.002]. 
8. Although the meta-analysis revealed no significant differences in post-decisional 
outcomes between the 15-option, final choice condition and the rating condition, no work 
to our knowledge has used rating many options as a control task when assessing post-
decisional evaluations after choice overload (see Vohs et al., 2008, for an example 
assessing subsequent self-regulation). Thus, we cannot speak to whether this null finding 
is consistent with other work examining choice overload response. 
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Table 1 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Experiment 1) 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
Profile-viewing period              
1. Challenge/threat index --             
2. TPR reactivity -.838*** --            
3. CO reactivity .838*** -.405*** --           
4. Task engagement index .265** -.059 .385*** --          
5. HR reactivity .021 .176 .212* .833*** --         
6. VC reactivity .419*** -.274* .428*** .833*** .386*** --        
Decision period              
7. Challenge/threat index .771*** -.659*** .633*** .252* .043 .376*** --       
8. TPR reactivity -.654*** .828*** -.269** -.040 .171 -.238* -.834*** --      
9. CO reactivity .633*** -.272*** .788*** .379*** .243* .389*** .834*** -.392*** --     
10. Task engagement index .022 .156 .192 .791*** .695*** .622*** .131 .104 .323** --    
11. HR reactivity -.158 .310* .045 .538*** .730*** .165 -.131 .319** .112 .795*** --   
12. VC reactivity .193 -.062 .260** .720*** .375*** .823*** .332** -.153 .402*** .795*** .264** --  
13. Self-reported choice overload -.135 .185 -.041 .081 .153 -.019 -.127 .185 -.026 .073 .101 .015 -- 
M 0 173.545 -.862 0 6.375 3.856 0 163.915 -.950 0 2.815 3.600 3.016 
SD 1 187.570 1.571 1 6.160 7.083 1 183.037 1.502 1 6.281 7.680 0.982 
Note. TPR = total peripheral resistance, CO = cardiac output, HR = heart rate, VC = ventricular contractility. Values reflect the 
subsample (N = 97) with no missing data across tasks and therefore differ slightly from task-specific values reported in the text.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics (Experiment 2) 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
Profile-viewing period              
1. Challenge/threat index --             
2. TPR reactivity -.906*** --            
3. CO reactivity -.906*** -.641*** --           
4. Task engagement index .154 .044 .322*** --          
5. HR reactivity -.030 .151 .096 .847*** --         
6. VC reactivity .290*** -.076 .450*** .847*** .435*** --        
Decision period              
7. Challenge/threat index .823*** -.715*** .776*** .199* .044 .293*** --       
8. TPR reactivity -.740*** .794*** -.547*** -.078 .006 -.138 -.905*** --      
9. CO reactivity .748*** -.499*** .856*** .282*** .086 .392*** .905*** -.636*** --     
10. Task engagement index .135 .053 .298*** .810*** .705*** .668*** .292*** -.134 .394*** --    
11. HR reactivity -.021 .114 .076 .587*** .778*** .216* .072 -.003 .128 .795*** --   
12. VC reactivity .236** -.029 .399*** .701*** .342*** .846*** .392*** -.210* .498*** .795*** .263** --  
13. Self-reported choice overload .147 -.140 .126 .131 .125 .096 .218* -.219* .175 .159 .043 .210 -- 
M 0 180.456 -0.631 0 7.842 6.452 0 213.447 -0.863 0 7.869 4.371 3.129 
SD 1 202.107 1.630 1 6.038 8.464 1 218.111 1.762 1 6.140 8.592 1.066 
Note. TPR = total peripheral resistance, CO = cardiac output, HR = heart rate, VC = ventricular contractility. Values reflect the 
subsample (N = 125) with no missing data across tasks and therefore differ slightly from task-specific values reported in the text. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Unadjusted Means and Standard Deviations by Condition (Experiments 1-3) 
 
 
Measure 
 
 
Experiment 
 
15-option; Final 
M (SD)  
 
4-option; Final 
M (SD) 
 
15-option; Rating 
M (SD) 
 
15-option; Reversible 
M (SD) 
      
Profile-viewing period      
Task engagement index 1 0.43 (1.30) -0.22 (0.71) -0.02 (1.09) -0.17 (0.69) 
 2 0.26 (1.10) -0.18 (0.90) -0.25 (0.96) 0.18 (0.99) 
      
HR reactivity 1 9.73 (7.51) 4.99 (4.51) 5.76 (6.34) 5.35 (4.07) 
 2 9.31 (5.95) 6.89 (5.51) 6.03 (6.82) 8.96 (5.25) 
      
VC reactivity 1 5.11 (9.05) 2.94 (5.57) 4.46 (7.12) 3.14 (6.33) 
 2 7.95 (9.49) 5.02 (8.04) 5.20 (6.05) 7.25 (9.58) 
      
Challenge/threat index 1 -0.07 (1.14) 0.18 (1.02) -0.09 (0.96) -0.002 (0.93) 
 2 -0.29 (0.76) 0.13 (0.83) 0.12 (0.88) -0.003 (1.34) 
      
TPR reactivity 1 199.95 (227.69) 132.10 (171.31) 202.86 (196.98) 164.43 (145.19) 
 2 226.57 (167.79) 143.04 (134.91) 138.16 (177.49) 211.69 (211.69) 
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CO reactivity 1 -0.85 (1.83) -0.76 (1.77) -0.88 (1.31) -0.97 (1.68) 
 2 -1.09 (1.29) -0.53 (1.56) -0.61 (1.35) -0.38 (2.02) 
      
n 1 24 24 30 26 
 2 28 32 32 36 
      
Decision period      
Task engagement index 1 0.38 (1.16) -0.41 (0.61) -0.10 (1.04) 0.13 (0.97) 
 2 0.16 (1.17) -0.39 (0.71) -0.10 (0.86) 0.33 (1.10) 
      
HR reactivity 1 5.93 (7.17) 0.19 (4.42) 1.64 (6.30) 3.65 (5.73) 
 2 8.29 (6.82) 6.59 (5.33) 7.24 (6.37) 9.29 (6.03) 
      
VC reactivity 1 4.45 (8.43) 1.76 (5.85) 3.76 (8.20) 4.20 (7.92) 
 2 6.00 (9.37) 0.88 (6.66) 3.81 (5.57) 6.87 (10.76) 
      
Challenge/threat index 1 -0.28 (1.20) 0.29 (0.80) 0.12 (0.76) -0.14 (1.16) 
 2 -0.32 (0.93) 0.01 (0.77) 0.25 (0.91) -0.01 (1.25) 
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TPR reactivity 1 222.39 (233.20) 112.90 (152.59) 144.13 (142.48) 178.26 (192.98) 
 2 282.00 (193.35) 200.74 (157.91) 146.30 (186.37) 235.53 (288.30) 
      
CO reactivity 1 -1.17 (1.96) -0.63 (1.13) -0.82 (1.10) -1.17 (1.73) 
 2 -1.31 (1.79) -0.94 (1.47) -0.59 (1.62) -0.71 (2.08) 
      
n 1 22 21 29 25 
 2 26 32 32 35 
      
Post-decision      
Self-reported overload  1 3.07 (1.00) 2.73 (0.99) 2.87 (0.83) 3.35 (0.97) 
9-item measure 2 2.99 (1.04) 2.83 (1.11) 3.49 (1.19) 3.16 (0.81) 
 3 3.41 (2.05) 3.15 (1.85) 3.16 (1.80) 3.47 (2.05) 
4-item measure 3 5.12 (0.33) 3.58 (0.29) 4.10 (0.29) 5.31 (0.33) 
      
n 1 24 24 30 26 
 2 28 32 32 36 
 3 58 71 75 58 
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Table 4 
Summary of ANOVA/ANCOVA Analyses for Experiments 1-3 
 
 
 
Measure 
 
 
Experiment 
 
15-option; Final VS 
4-option 
 
 
15-option; Final VS 
Rating 
 
 
15-option, Final VS 
15-option; Reversible 
 
  F             η  F              η  F               η  
     
Profile-viewing period    
Task Engagement 1 5.34*        .051 2.82┼        .027 4.71*         .044 
 2 3.03┼        .024 4.08*        .032 0.12           .001 
     
HR reactivity 1 8.01**      .074 6.25*        .058 7.13**      .067 
 2 2.89┼            .023 5.06*        .040 0.09         .000 
     
VC reactivity 1 1.10          .011 0.12          .001 0.96          .009 
 2 2.53          .020 2.25          .018 0.30          .002 
     
Challenge/threat index 1 5.67*        .058 3.13         .033 0.46         .005 
 2 3.82┼            .030 3.80┼         .030 1.44         .011 
     
TPR reactivity 1 1.96         .019 0.01        .000 0.67         .007 
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 2 3.84┼            .031 4.16*        .034 0.74          .006 
     
CO reactivity 1 1.60          .014 0.42         .004 0.40         .004 
 2 4.84*        .039 4.41*       .036 4.45*       .036 
     
Decision period    
Task Engagement 1 7.16**       .072 3.12┼        .032 0.77        .008 
 2 4.57*         .036 1.08          .009 0.44        .004 
     
HR reactivity 1 9.80**      .095 6.35*        .064 1.69        .018 
 2 1.10          .009 0.42          .003 0.40        .003 
     
VC reactivity 1 1.30          .014 0.10          .001 0.01       .000 
 2 5.38*        .043 0.98          .008 0.16       .001 
     
Challenge/threat index 1 5.67*       .058 3.13         .033 0.46       .005 
 2 4.04*       .033 7.00*       .055 1.07       .009 
     
TPR reactivity 1 3.13┼          .033 1.99         .021 0.61       .007 
 2 3.24┼          .026 6.71*       .053 0.52       .004 
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CO reactivity 1 5.15*        .053 2.49         .027 0.12        .001 
 2 3.31┼            .027 4.67*       .037 1.35        .011 
     
Post-decision     
Self-reported 1 1.56          .015 0.64        .006 1.06        .011 
Choice overload 2 0.35          .003 3.42┼         .027 0.45        .004 
 3 7.54**      .028 4.45*      .017 0.15        .000 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. ┼p < .1  *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Task engagement cardiovascular reactivity index scores during the profile-viewing period in Experiments 1 and 2. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. 
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Figure 2. Task engagement cardiovascular reactivity index scores during the decision period in Experiments 1 and 2. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. 
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Figure 3. Challenge/threat cardiovascular reactivity index scores during the profile-viewing period in Experiments 1 and 2. Error bars 
indicate standard errors.  
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Figure 4. Challenge/threat cardiovascular reactivity index scores during the decision period in Experiments 1 and 2. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. 
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• We assessed cardiovascular measures of engagement and threat during a choice task 
• Participants either selected from many or few options, or rated many options  
• Selecting from many options simultaneously predicted greater engagement and threat 
• The current work suggests a novel motivational account of choice overload 
